



From Bodily Symptom to  
Existential Experience
Tina Williams and Havi Carel
Existentially, breathlessness is a constant reminder of impending mortal-
ity. Most of us want to die in our sleep with no knowledge of the event. 
Not only do patients with chronic, progressive lung disease know of their 
impending death months, years or decades ahead of the day, they fear how 
they will die, with the fear of suffocation always somewhere in their minds. 
—Currow and Johnson, “Dyspnoea”
This chapter uses a phenomenological approach to investigate the philosophi-
cal significance of a common yet debilitating experience: the experience of 
severe and pathological breathlessness. Using two key examples of breath-
lessness in the case of respiratory disease (somatic) and in anxiety disorders 
(considered as mental disorder) we show why a phenomenological approach 
to the study of these experiences is needed and how the distinction between 
the somatic and the mental comes under pressure when considering a com-
plex phenomenon like breathlessness.
We see the distinction between the somatic and the mental as emerging 
from a key problem in modern health care: a disproportionate commitment 
to a worldview that prioritizes the physiological over the holistic (Aho and 
Aho 2009). This worldview can be associated with problems in healthcare 
provision, communication between health professionals and ill persons, and 
in outcomes (see Carel 2013a; Toombs 1987; Department of Health 2011). 
This approach, we suggest, gives rise to a failure to adequately account for 
the alterations in the lifeworld of the respiratory patient. This approach also 
occludes the complex and shifting nature of breathlessness, which is a unique 
medical symptom, as we explain below.
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As a result of the prioritization of the physiological, we suggest that 
patients are subject to unnecessary suffering, inappropriate treatments, 
increased failure rates in outcomes, and epistemic injustice (cf. Carel and 
Kidd 2014; Critchton et al. 2016). Moreover, we suggest that clinicians’ 
knowledge, understanding, and treatment of comorbid mental health condi-
tions in respiratory patients is lacking and further exacerbates an already 
complex and debilitating health concern.
Furthermore, research shows that the impact of patients’ socioeconomic, 
cultural, and mental health status affects the development, treatment, and 
management of respiratory disorders, and so needs to be addressed in the 
context of respiratory medicine (Wilson 2006). For instance, studies show 
that patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD) are often 
poor, working-class smokers (Pauwels and Rabe 2004). We thus argue that 
socioeconomic status is part of patients’ life-world and therefore plays a 
constitutive role in their health and well-being (Department of Health 2008; 
Gysels and Higginson 2008; Marmot 2010).
In those with a mental health diagnosis, rates of respiratory disorders 
increase, as many patients with depression or anxiety (for example) also 
smoke to cope with their anxiety (Wilson 2006; van Manen et al. 2002). One 
study found anxiety and depression rates of 80 percent in COPD patients 
who smoke (Kunik et al. 2005). In prison populations, up to 90 percent are 
smokers, and many have smoking-related disorders as well as mental health 
conditions, both of which are underdiagnosed, alongside restricted access 
to pulmonary rehabilitation, an efficacious intervention for breathlessness 
discomfort (Turner and Jefford 2013). So it is also a health inequality issue 
(Department of Health 2010; Social Exclusion Task force 2010).
Focusing on phenomenological descriptions of the person as being-in-
the-world can help us begin to address inadequate understandings of respi-
ratory illness. This has been the focus of the Life of Breath, a Wellcome 
Trust–funded research project we are members of (www.lifeofbreath.org). 
Indeed, our work suggests that a phenomenological framework captures how 
the structures of experience and the possibilities of certain experiences are 
changed in patients with breathlessness and panic disorder (Carel, Dodd, 
and Macnaughton 2015). Moreover, this approach can help explicate the 
“problem of differentiation” whereby clinicians and patients alike struggle to 
distinguish breathlessness caused by respiratory illness from that caused by 
panic anxiety.
We argue that phenomenological description and explanation is indispens-
able to our understanding of the difficulties faced by patients. Attention to the 
life-world of the patient is essential to making their experience intelligible. It 
is also indispensable to medical understanding of the impact of breathlessness 
on conditions that challenge this dichotomous understanding, which, in turn, 
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results in compartmentalized treatment of these illnesses. We hope that the 
reconceptualization of breathlessness disorders in phenomenological terms 
will contribute to improved patient care, reduced misunderstandings and epis-
temic injustice, and improved ability to address the interrelated issues which 
arise from these illnesses.
Many studies show significant barriers in place for those with physical 
illnesses comorbid with mental health conditions; in this context, many 
physical symptoms are at risk of being dismissed due to the mental health 
diagnosis, resulting in integrated care obstacles (Gysels and Higginson 2008). 
This is a further reason to study these disorders. Detailing the experiences of 
such patients is important in order to understand how and why this happens, 
and suggest ways to address these troubling problems (Rethink Mental Illness 
2012; Department of Health 2011; Hegarty 2011).
BREATHLESSNESS: FROM SYMPTOM TO EXPERIENCE
The ability to breathe underpins human life; it is vital to all we do. Not only 
do we unconsciously alter our breathing when talking and moving; we can 
also control our breath to dive, avoid inhaling toxic fumes around cities, and 
calm ourselves. In people with respiratory disease, the struggle to breathe is 
often a mortal threat.
Imagine sprinting up several flights of stairs and getting out of breath. 
Now imagine feeling like that all the time. When you cannot catch your 
breath terror, panic and a sense of suffocation overcome you. Thus anxiety 
often accompanies pathological breathlessness, due to a constant sense of 
threat and bodily betrayal (Smoller et al. 1996; Carel 2016). Importantly, this 
experience is largely invisible and difficult to describe, despite being one of 
the leading causes of suffering in the UK, and a significant cause of death 
that is on the rise (World Health Organization 2016). This invisibility stems 
in part from stigma attached to breathlessness (associated with smoking) 
and pronouncedly to mental illness, due to perceptions of responsibility and 
weakness of will (Crichton et al. 2017). This invisibility also has an embodied 
dimension: When the breath is stifled, talk is silenced, communication cut 
off and in its extreme manifestation, both panic and oxygen deprivation can 
significantly impact thinking itself (O’Donnell et al. 2007; LeDoux 2015).
However, can we sharply distinguish the physiological from the mental 
in the experience of breathlessness? Can we separate somatic sensations 
from how they are experienced, interpreted, and expressed? In our view, 
the answer is no. Breathlessness is a unique medical symptom and experi-
ence that of its essence involves sensation, cognition, and reasoning, none of 
which are reducible to the other. To think of it purely in physiological terms 
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is inadequate as the experience has significant emotional, cognitive, and 
interpretative dimensions. Thus we have a significant and common medical 
symptom that unsettles the distinction between somatic and mental symptoms 
and disorders.
How is breathlessness typically characterized in both medicine and lay 
knowledge? While the physiological components are bound to a wide variety 
of subjective and cultural ideas about breath, and thus may vary considerably, 
typical sensations include feeling short of breath, winded, difficulty in inhala-
tion or exhalation, air hunger, chest tightness, and discomfort when breathing 
(Carel 2014). Not every experience of breathlessness includes every sensa-
tion, nor is it at the same intensity for different episodes and there is much 
felt variation between and within individuals (Abernathy and Wheeler 2008; 
Smoller et al. 1996; Lansing et al. 2009).
In terms of the etiology of pathological breathlessness, no two cases of 
underlying dysfunction will necessarily result in the same felt intensity or 
severity of the experience (Abernathy and Wheeler 2008; Haugdahl et al 
2015). Apart from the varying subjective qualities of breathlessness, and a 
wide range of underlying causes, intensity can also be difficult to measure, 
rendering evaluation, treatment, and management difficult and sometimes 
ineffective (American Thoracic Society 1995). Diagnosing and assessing 
breathlessness typically follows the medical model, insofar as the pathophysi-
ology is sought, via physical examination, patient history, and diagnostic 
tests. These include spirometry and lung function tests, as well as inventories 
such as the Chronic Respiratory Disease questionnaire (CRQ). If the con-
dition is not traced to a cause, or if the breathlessness cannot be relieved, 
management of symptoms is sought to reduce intensity, distress, and any 
comorbid mental or physical conditions, but these do not necessarily address 
the shrinking world of the patient.
In many respiratory conditions, the dysfunctional breathlessness cannot be 
corrected and so the patient’s abilities and lived experience are altered irre-
vocably (Gysels and Higginson 2008). In these cases, there will be varying 
levels of disability that are likely to worsen over time, but are often unlike 
other chronic disease progressions because of the impending and ever-present 
nature of episodic attacks (Eccleston 2016). For instance, acute exacerbations 
of respiratory infections can often result in death. As a patient put it, “If you 
can’t breathe you don’t live” (Nicholls 2003, 132). Understanding, managing, 
and attending to the patient experience—including their voice when they are 
not too breathless to talk—can be a matter of life and death. Without such 
study, high rates of suffering from the misdiagnosis, underdiagnosis, and 
undertreatment of breathlessness will continue (Currow and Johnson 2015).
The term breathlessness needs to be conceptually clarified to investigate 
whether it captures a common feature and so has corresponding clinical 
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utility, or if the experiences differ widely and require us to modify our con-
ceptualization of pathological breathlessness and correlating clinical under-
standing. For example, in the case of pernicious anemia, a breathlessness 
symptom previously classed as “shortness of breath” has now been changed 
to be described as “the sighs” to capture the difference between these experi-
ences. Patients who experience air hunger feel that they struggle to get the 
air in and out. Those with pernicious anemia describe the feeling of needing 
to gulp in air at a slow, steady pace when exerted but, importantly, do not 
encounter difficulty in doing this. Thus the term breathlessness in these two 
cases does not refer to the same type of experience (Haugdahl et al. 2017). 
Hence understanding, defining, and labeling different types of breathlessness 
is important so that clinician and patient can differentiate between different 
types of breathlessness to get to the correct diagnosis. Careful attention to 
such differences can aid our understanding of the lived experience of specific 
types of breathlessness, alongside improving clinician knowledge, which 
may help prevent misdiagnosis or unnecessary treatment for asthma, a com-
mon misdiagnosis in cases of pernicious anemia (Chanarin 1992).1
ANXIETY AND BREATHLESSNESS
With the progressive and irreversible nature of COPD, differing rates of felt 
breathlessness, inflammation of the airways, sputum accumulation, and resul-
tant cough, it is unsurprising that there is a higher prevalence of anxiety dis-
orders in these patients compared to the general population. Studies suggest 
that anxiety disorders appear in approximately 50 percent of COPD patients 
(compared to about 6 percent in the general population). Other mental health 
conditions such as depression and agoraphobia are also more likely to appear 
in that population (Smoller et al. 1996). Effects such as restricted mobility, 
lower reported quality of life, worsening overall health, and functional dis-
ability are often consequences of anxiety, even in those without respiratory 
disorders. These issues are often underdiagnosed and undertreated in comor-
bid respiratory cases, worsening the impact of these disorders on the patient 
(McManus et al. 2016). Mental symptoms are often ignored or seen as an 
inevitable consequence of respiratory disease (Maurer et al. 2008).
Studying breathless and anxious experience can help us understand 
problems in the medical attitude to illness. One overarching problem is the 
reduction of the suffering person to biological processes; this ultimately 
separates the body from its subject (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1962; Aho and Aho 
2009; Carel 2016; Ratcliffe 2015; Svenaeus 2000; Toombs 1987). Further, 
many mental disorders are not easy to differentiate from physical disorders 
(Ratcliffe 2015). Depression and anxiety disorders include physiological 
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distress such as breathlessness, rapid heart rate, gastro-intestinal upset, and 
other flu-like somatic symptoms (Kirkengen 2010; Ratcliffe et al. 2013). So 
how can we capture and address these varied illness experiences included in 
comorbid respiratory and anxiety disorders? This is what we call the problem 
of differentiation.
The definition of anxiety disorders, found in the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5 
2013a), relies on differentiating between fear and anxiety as an appropriate 
response to a real or impending threat, as opposed to an anticipatory state 
related to distressing distorted thoughts or irrational beliefs regarding certain 
situations, bodily feelings, and other perceived threats (cf. Esser et al. 2015). 
Anxiety often leads to avoidance behaviors that may temporarily reduce anxi-
ety symptoms, yet increasingly result in hypervigilance, reduced activities, 
and maintaining the fight-or-flight response (DSM-5 2013a, 189).
As we are focusing on anxiety and its relationship to the lived world of 
the breathless person, an immediate difficulty arises because the anxiety 
response often arises from the fear of having an acute breathlessness episode, 
a potential threat to life experienced by the patient previously, and thus a 
realistic concern. Past events of acute breathlessness inform the present and 
arouse anxiety about the future. It is difficult for patients and clinicians to 
initially distinguish between the breathlessness caused by panic anxiety and 
the underlying respiratory illness. Moreover, anxiety is often experienced 
prior to breathing difficulties, as a warning that blood oxygen levels are low 
(see below). This, again, demonstrates that aspects of breathing disruption 
are nonreducible to discrete physiological, emotional, and psychological ele-
ments. Intense fearful thoughts, including thinking about death, fear of losing 
control, and feeling hopelessness and confusion, are also frequently reported 
(Willgoss et al. 2012).
We suggest, therefore, that three themes in the comorbidity of breathless-
ness and anxiety are revealed by a phenomenological analysis:
a A problematic relationship with breathing: Anxiety is not only a cause 
of breathlessness, nor a separate symptom. On the one hand, anxiety can 
warn of low blood oxygen saturation prior to the experience of breath-
lessness, and thus predates the conscious somatic experience (Eccleston 
2016). On the other, idiopathic anxiety episodes often occur in social situ-
ations such as visiting crowded spaces, and thus exacerbate physiologi-
cally caused breathlessness. This often results in a vicious cycle whereby 
anxiety and breathlessness trigger one another, and patterns of panic and 
fear of losing control lead one to reduced activities, social isolation, and 
resultant deconditioning that worsens health and increases the likelihood 
of depression (Willgoss et al. 2012; Eccleston 2016). As Willgoss notes: 
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“It’s like a vicious circle. Your breathing gets bad so you get anxious, 
then you get afraid, and your breathing gets worse, which makes you more 
afraid” (Willgoss et al. 2012, 565).
Such vicious cycles reinforce the “big five”: physiological, emotional, 
cognitive, behavioral, and situational binds that are triggered in anxiety and 
breathlessness, making it much harder for the patient to break free from the 
panic (Wells 1997; LeDoux 2015). Avoidant behavior and hypervigilance 
leave the patient exhausted and on constant high alert (LeDoux 2015, 17). 
Further, breathlessness conditions such as asthma are more common in those 
with comorbid anxiety and depressive symptoms, with a higher prevalence 
in women, pointing to gendered and social contributions to the development 
of these disorders (Kewalramani et al. 2008; Kirkengen 2010; cf. Hegarty 
2011).
b Anxiety, like severe breathlessness, is often experienced as uncontrollable, 
with an almost constant fight to regain control, as panic and helplessness 
are felt while trying to control the anxiety. One could attempt to regain 
control by practicing “self-talk” (Willgoss et al. 2012), or by employ-
ing safety behaviors such as sitting by exits. This may alleviate some of 
the stress in the short term but also creates an association between these 
behaviors and prevention of anxiety, which becomes distorted so that 
elements of magical thinking and further avoidance behaviors come into 
play. This maintains the anxiety or panic disorder as the patient does not 
challenge his or her beliefs about anxiety and its relationship to his or her 
condition (Wells 1997).
c The life-changing and life-limiting nature of such experiences. Experi-
ences of anxiety and severe breathlessness are often described as traumatic 
and isolating with some patients referring to them as “near-death experi-
ences” (Willgoss et al. 2012). Feeling unable to breathe adequately, being 
smothered, or unable to escape often causes meta-worry (worry about 
worry) due to the fear of an uncontrollable panic attack. Furthermore, 
caregivers often underestimate the severity and intensity of breathing dis-
tress due to its terrifying yet subjective and silent nature (cf. Binks et al. 
2016). Indeed, the persistent worry and sense of impending doom overlaps 
with another anxiety disorder, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and so 
multiple morbidities can interact and reinforce feelings of loss of control. 
Not even sleep can offer respite in some cases: Many respiratory patients 
suffer from nocturnal hypoxemia. A consequence of this is startled 
awakening and disturbed sleep, described as feeling suffocated, choking, 
and terrified of dying “making anxiety as a 24-hour ongoing disorder” 
(Alkhuja 2013, 82).
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When the triggers to the occurrence of panic attacks and anxiety are vague 
and the episodes idiopathic, the patient does not know when the next attack 
will occur. This can be understood in terms of the world itself becoming an 
object of fear for the patient and explains why some anxiety patients become 
housebound even when their breathlessness is not caused by an underly-
ing physiological pathology. Here, panic anxiety is not just due to bodily 
betrayal; the threat of breathlessness can be viewed as a threat with both an 
internal and external source. Internally, the body is experienced as a source 
of threat with breathlessness causing the fear of choking, suffocation, and loss 
of control. Panic attacks thereby alienate the patients from their usual being 
at home in the world, with the threat posed by one’s own self felt as a bodily 
or brain betrayal as the fear and anxiety take over despite no discernible 
underlying pathology (Svenaeus 2000). Externally, the world can be viewed 
as a threat with cognitions of not feeling safe due to the world’s hostility and 
potential source of the onset of another attack: for instance, when pollen sets 
off an asthma attack, or when a panic attack has previously occurred in a 
supermarket or other public place under the stigmatizing gaze of others in the 
world. Others, too, can be perceived as sources of danger to the anxious per-
son, whether it is through worry of judgment when undergoing a breathless, 
panicked episode to medical stereotyping of a mental health diagnosis. Fur-
ther avoidance and withdrawal from social, medical, and everyday situations 
can lead to agoraphobia and becoming housebound, restricting patients’ lives 
and future experiences.
We suggest that psychiatric and psychological conceptualization and 
treatment for anxiety present difficulties related to separating symptoms 
into cognitive, affective, physiological, and temporal categorizations, which 
we contrast with the lived experience of these conditions as arising out of 
and affecting the life-world of the patient. These are experiences that, when 
studied, reveal the primordial, interrelated, and mutually impacting features 
of these disorders. Reducing anxiety to faulty information processing leading 
to false beliefs and negative thinking cuts off the potential revelatory power 
of these experiences (cf. Wells 1997; LeDoux 2015). We suggest that this is 
where phenomenology can supplement medical accounts.
Anxiety already has a complex history in philosophical thought; think-
ers such as Kierkegaard and Heidegger argued for the power of anxiety in 
creatively shaping human existence. The focus on the productive role of 
anxious feelings in providing an opportunity for reflection, has, we argue, 
been stripped away from the perspective of clinical psychology and psy-
chiatry, which view anxiety as a dysfunctional condition that must be treated 
rapidly with little consideration of its existential meanings and its impact on 
the patient’s agency and self-understanding (cf. NICE 2011; Haugdahl et al. 
2015). In other words, the potential revelatory power of anxious experience 
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lies in the experience telling us that something is wrong in how we live; that 
only “I” can take responsibility for my facticity and use this opportunity to 
choose who I want to be (Heidegger 1962, 304).
O. van den Bergh (2016) argues that interpretation, subjective certainty, 
past experiences, fear of bodily sensations, and interoceptive bias have an 
important role in the perception of breathlessness. Developing disambigua-
tion strategies for dealing with the fear of bodily sensations and ambiguity 
in decision making would help patients cope with their comorbid symptoms 
and increase feelings of agency; but this is possible only through exploring 
these experiences in terms of their lived world and subjective interpretation. 
This is a world that includes environmental and socioeconomic factors and 
how these affect autonomous agents, who understand how their illness alters 
their life. They can then reflect on the transformations to their experience and 
take a stance on their existence, instead of feeling powerless and isolated by 
the alienating, depersonalized, and controlling features of the illness and the 
healthcare setting. However, anxiety is often dismissed as an irrational expe-
rience to be treated by cognitive restructuring, pharmacological interventions, 
or behavioral therapies (Teachman et al. 2010). Again, the physiological 
focus means that the symptoms are to be treated while the existential meaning 
and social or environmental factors often remain unaddressed.
The potential meaning and intelligibility of these disorders in the context of 
individual human existence, discourse, and social structures impacting self-
understanding and potential positive aspects of anxiety is therefore closed 
off. Perhaps attending to the anxious experience in relation to the insidi-
ous increase of respiratory disease in the current climate can tell us more 
about modern vulnerabilities and concerns in an era of environmental and 
political instability. At the very least more should be done to recognize the 
relationship between anxiety and respiratory illnesses, the consequences of 
undertreatment and underdiagnosis, and finally the lack of treatment options 
in integrating these areas of illness into the patient’s healing (Department of 
Health 2008).
A PHENOMENOLOGY OF ANXIOUS BREATHLESSNESS
We now turn to phenomenology to reveal the experiential features of anxious 
and breathless experiences (Carel 2008, 42). Studying breathlessness via a 
phenomenological lens uncovers the normal, pre-reflective ways of existing 
in the world, providing opportunities for self-reflection and understanding. 
Carel’s (2013b) analysis of illness as a limit case of embodied experience 
describes how illness pulls us out of our everyday taken-for-granted exis-
tence (the “natural attitude”). It can be philosophically productive in that it 
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can show us how we normally exist in the world and provide us with deeper 
self-understanding (Carel 2013b, 346). Tacit areas of our existence such as 
bodily freedom, the habitual body, intentionality, and motility are uncovered 
and altered by attention to these breathless experiences (cf. Merleau-Ponty 
1962). In fact, the phenomenological reduction and bracketing of the natural 
attitude is analogous to the distancing effect that illness creates (Carel 2013b). 
We step back from our everyday absorption in the world through breathless 
experiences and can reflect on the structures of embodied experience through 
this distancing. Like Heidegger’s (1962) notion of angst, possibilities, proj-
ects, and our everyday living become radically inaccessible when meaningful 
existence collapses.
Disclosive affectivity thus implicates the central significance of the body 
in human experience despite the noted absence in Heidegger of an explicit 
analysis of the body. Mood, or attunement, is not a mental intentional state 
accessible only to the conscious subject. Moods color our interactions within 
the world and shape how things appear and matter to us (Heidegger 1962, 
227; Ratcliffe 2008).
Can this phenomenological notion of the collapse of intelligibility in angst 
map onto anxiety as defined in psychiatric classification manuals such as the 
DSM? We suggest so. Certainly cases of specific phobias are more akin to the 
ontic descriptions of fleeing from owning up to one’s own self and of misin-
terpreting the self in terms of das Man (Heidegger 1962, 164–165). However, 
the loss of significance and looming threat can cause momentary or enduring 
collapses into the angst that Heidegger described. Indeed, the anxiety and 
panic in these anxious experiences may arguably also be ontic versions of 
angst where the self is covered over and fear displaced onto an undefined 
threat. However, we believe that there is still a utility to exploring these expe-
riences. This is because they shed light on human freedom and our reflexive 
natures which enable us to utilize anxious experience to reflect on who we are. 
In other words, while gripped by angst, the understanding of what it means to 
be, or existence as a whole, can come into view (Carel 2013a).
In both experiences (of breathlessness and of angst) what remains most 
vivid even after the collapse of intelligibility and the ensuing practical 
paralysis is the confrontation with our own death. Studying these experiences 
reveals that one day I will no longer exist. That nothingness can overwhelm 
me at any time. Once I face this, embracing the full awareness of my own 
death, I can reclaim my existence and stop it being governed by the demands 
and interpretations of others (Heidegger 1962, 308).
This account fits with the changes to body image, self-identity, and self-
understanding frequently reported by patients with dyspnea and panic disor-
der (Carel 2013b; Carel 2016). As previously described, rather than the body 
being in the background while people are going about their daily activities, 
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they now become aware of new limitations: Breathlessness and a tight chest 
bring their awareness back to the body and how they can no longer live care-
free, but rather exist under the constant threat of mortality. Their body image 
is altered through changes to embodiment and existential threat via breath-
lessness (Carel 2016; Haugdahl et al. 2017). They may no longer understand 
themselves as healthy, or identify as an athlete, as illness progresses and 
restricts these possibilities.
Breathlessness and anxiety experiences thus cause a shift in the life-world 
and embodied experience of the patient. They must find new ways of coping 
with changes in their habitual repertoire, due to the closing down of certain 
possibilities (Carel 2016). Indeed, the initial crisis of symptom appearance or 
diagnosis often causes grief and so it is important that clinicians are aware 
of emotional needs the patients may have by considering their experiences 
as illuminated by phenomenology (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1962, 189). Evidence 
shows that phenomenological descriptions match qualitative research and 
patient descriptions of their disorders and so reflect the reality of the patient 
experience (Ratcliffe and Broome 2012).
We suggest that in cases of common but severe mental disorders such 
as panic disorder comorbid with respiratory illness, the pre-anxious, pre-
breathless body is often hard to re-access. Knowledge of the habitual body 
performing certain roles and actions becomes so remote that the memory of 
them almost takes on a “dream-like quality” (Ratcliffe 2013). This can in part 
account for the insidious character of these disorders: Not only are these rou-
tines and possible ways of being closed off to me, I cannot remember taking 
them up and enacting them nor imagine doing so in the future. Their signifi-
cance and meaning have been suspended and no longer show up as something 
that I could do, nor that I want to any longer (Carel 2011). In chronic illness, 
the habitual body often adapts to the losses in motor habits and previously 
enjoyed activities, but these lost abilities still hold significance and meaning 
for the sufferer that may begin to diminish as time passes. They must adapt 
to the new limitations by carefully attending to their new embodied situation:
It may be said that the body is “the hidden form of being our self,” or on the 
other hand, that personal existence is “the taking up and manifestation of a being 
in a given situation.” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 192)
However, there are potential positive aspects to these experiences. The loss 
of significance described here as caused by these comorbid illnesses can be 
recovered whence the body is opened once again
to others or to the past, when it opens the way to co-existence and once more 
(in the active sense) acquires significance beyond itself. Moreover, even when 
cut off from the circuit of existence, the body never quite falls back onto itself. 
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Even if I become absorbed in the experience of my body and in the solitude of 
sensations, I do not succeed in abolishing all reference of my life to a world. 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 191)
The world is always calling to me to respond in addition to the intentionality 
directed toward the vista in front of me, or of consideration of my next task. 
Anxiety is thus a temporary experience, but still one with the power to disrupt 
this return. Healthcare practitioners can help aid an incorporation of these 
experiences into the life of the patient to return him or her to the world of 
concern, pointedly by the concepts of leaping ahead of the patient, rather than 
leaping in and removing his or her agency (Heidegger 1962, 159). Exploring 
the life-world of the patient and the impact of these complex syndromes on 
his or her ability-to-be is thus imperative.
This focus may also prevent hermeneutical injustice, a subtype of epis-
temic injustice, defined as “the injustice of having some significant area of 
one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to 
hermeneutical marginalization” (Fricker 2007, 158). The lack of shared her-
meneutical resources specifically catering to anxious respiratory patients may 
be attributable to testimonial injustice, with patient knowledge of the severity 
of their breathlessness silenced or discounted by clinicians who instead focus 
on their prior mental health diagnosis, socioeconomic status, and prejudices 
stemming from smoking status (Crichton et al. 2017). The consequences of 
breathlessness, from struggling to talk to increasing rates of physical disabil-
ity, possibly leading one to become housebound, contribute to these already-
significant barriers in communicating suffering to clinicians due to being too 
breathless and exhausted to talk or access appropriate treatment for mental 
and somatic symptoms, for example, to be able to attend various clinics for 
treatment, and even to think.
The lack of appropriate contact between the patient and clinician is “insuf-
ficient to be able to truly understand the challenges that people face in the 
attempt to integrate a chronic illness into their lives” (Fraser, Kee, and Minick 
2006, 550). Indeed, we suggest that phenomenological exploration reveals 
there should be a refocusing on their lived experience rather than on treating 
the symptoms in isolation from one another. For instance, addressing breath-
lessness symptoms or fatigue as discrete fails to capture the wider picture of 
the debilitating effects of chronic respiratory illnesses, aspects that include 
social isolation, difficulty in attending outpatient facilities due to fluctuating 
symptoms, reduced mobility, and so on. The picture can be disjointed, and 
knowledge and treatment lacking.
As phenomenology reveals, we are active agents in the world, skillfully 
coping with encountered entities; that skillful coping is disrupted in chronic 
illness. We can therefore see why medical treatment can be alienating: 
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Agency is handed over to those assumed to have the best knowledge and 
skills. A clinician may further alienate a patient when frustration with their 
failure to attend a pulmonary rehabilitation session or complete homework, 
for instance, shows their lack of understanding or appreciation of the impact 
the disorder has on the person and fails to appreciate how intrusive biomedi-
cine can be to patients’ personal lives.
CONCLUSION
Within biomedical practice, large differences exist between how practitio-
ners think about disease and illness and how patients experience their illness 
(Toombs 1987, 1993; Carel 2013a). For example, medical practitioners often 
thematize illness in terms of patterns of symptoms that persist over time. The 
symptoms are measured, tested, and form part of the constitution of a func-
tional abnormality, a disease. Yet for the patient, the illness is experienced as 
a way of being, to be lived through and coped with (Carel 2013a).
How these experiences affect patients’ understanding of their disorders is 
often overlooked. The patients respond to their diagnosis and illness experi-
ence, reflecting on what these experiences mean to their current and future 
ways of living (Jutel 2011). With a diagnosis of a chronic illness, the patients 
may understandably respond with despair, or the realization of the transience 
of life and an opportunity to take control of their remaining health (ibid.). 
Other patients struggle to make sense of their experiences through medical 
narratives alone (Svenaeus 2000). Such a reductive view fails to capture 
human existence as an embodied, self-interpreting agency in a world with 
others, who can also take a stand on the patient’s illness.2 Although an objec-
tive medical focus on disease has its place in managing the disorder and alle-
viating suffering, this view is incomplete (Svenaeus 2000; Kirkengen 2010).
Biomedicine neither prioritizes nor fully utilizes patient experience of 
medical care despite medicine’s stated commitment to patient-centered care 
(NICE 2011). The consequences of this range from failing to meet patient 
needs comprehensively to lacking a complete, adequate picture of the effects 
of illness and medical intervention on the patient. Indeed, the patients’ experi-
ence of their disorder in the clinical encounter and management of their disor-
ders often reveals injustices committed against them (Carel and Kidd 2014). 
We suggest that phenomenological description, for example, the patient tool-
kit developed by Carel (2012b, 2013a), can thematize patient experiences and 
provide deeper knowledge and understanding of these human ways of being 
and experiences of medical care.
Phenomenology is free of naturalistic or scientific commitment to ways 
of ordering experience and entities in the world. Diverse experiences of 
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illness across episodes, individuals, and even cultures are not subsumed 
under preexisting categories or epistemological frameworks. Instead patient 
experiences are listened to and described, with shared themes and features 
of illness appearing without any dogmatic structuring from the listener. This 
allows the patients to be heard, and a study of alterations in their existence 
through their experiences to be attended to. Attending to illness phenomeno-
logically discloses the shared world of meaning whereby features of illness 
experiences are described in order for the patient and those around him or 
her to understand the changes brought about through illness. Practically, this 
knowledge can be used in practitioner training to redress issues such as com-
munication difficulties.
Ultimately, phenomenology provides a framework to describe the closing 
down of possibilities and human ways of existing. In contrast to phenom-
enological description, then, naturalistic or biomedical accounts continue to 
fail in accounting for these differences. Phenomenology hence provides a 
descriptive and interpretive framework to describe these transformations to 
lived experiences and personhood, which can complement medical under-
standing of illness experiences. It also offers freedom from certain meta-
physical or epistemological commitments that underpin reductive accounts 
of human existence. For example, Nicholls argues that chronic breathlessness 
can be viewed as “a product of a person’s life experience rather than as a 
patho-physiological entity” (Nicholls 2003, 124). In contrast to seeing illness 
as a manifestation of an underlying disease process, he argues for the impor-
tance of the personal meaning of illness in qualitative research, underscoring 
a move from biomedical traditional focus on symptom descriptions to an 
account that captures a fluid, complex set of experiences that evidence-based 
medicine (EBM) fails to appreciate (Nicholls 2003, 125).
As we have described here, breathlessness conditions often have subjective 
multidimensional phenomena at their heart: personal, interpersonal, social, 
cultural, emotional, and metaphysical. Indeed, sometimes only the patients 
can interpret these experiences and so a phenomenological analysis is indis-
pensable (Nicholls 2003; Carel 2013b; Ratcliffe 2012).
Furthermore, the interaction between these varied elements is often under-
played in healthcare research (Nicholls 2003, 123). Rather than explaining 
illness responses as emerging rational narratives incorporated into the ill 
person’s bodily schema or identity, “chronic illness is a more complex, fluid, 
dynamic phenomenon that current biomedicine would have us believe” (ibid.).
Analogously, depression and anxiety disorders are not easily predictable 
in this manner either: spontaneous remission, worsening, and “good days/bad 
days,” for instance, show up the relational characteristics of illness experi-
ences. In other words, embodied existence is not partes extra partes. It is 
unified and modified both by the body as constitutive for experience, and 
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perception and the world shaping this experience, including the stance that 
the patient takes upon his or her illness.
Finally, we have seen how anxiety and breath are deeply related: The onset 
of anxiety can reveal oxygen deprivation. Episodes of breathlessness due to 
either “cause” are difficult to differentiate at first, and subjective variances 
that do not match objective measurements occur. Dualistic thinking underlies 
physical and mental clinical practice which causes many problems in under-
standing and treating certain illnesses. For instance, patients referred often 
struggled at first with their diagnosis of anxiety disorder; after many tests and 
referrals, they felt sure their symptoms (shortness of breath or heart palpita-
tions) were due to a somatic disease. This demonstrates the implicit dualistic 
thinking that underlies conceptions of mental disorders being in the mind, and 
physical symptoms as caused by a somatic disease and this is what patients 
have inherited from our social and medical milieu.
A potential remedy to these problems has been suggested by attending 
to the lived experiences of the anxious respiratory patient to understand the 
meaning and significance of these complex conditions. Such attention can aid 
the development of truly patient-centered integrated health care that evidence 
demands in such complex cases.
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NOTES
 1. Another example of how phenomenological description can help distinguish 
between two conditions is that of breathlessness in asthma and in COPD (Simon et al. 
1990; cf. Lansing et al. 2009). It seems that the term breathlessness may not describe 
the same type of experience in every case. We claim that it is important to have con-
ceptually clear accounts not only for clinical purposes, for example, to avoid misdi-
agnosis but also to understand what we mean by the term in order to understand the 
lived experiences of those who suffer from breathlessness and to reduce the alienation 
patient reportedly experience in the medical encounter (Toombs 1987). Unfortunately 
mental health practitioners are only just getting training on chronic illness integrated 
health care in the UK, so this was a tentative process.
 2. The invitation to reflection and to philosophize, to reexamine and reinterpret 
one’s life alongside modifying movements and goals uncovers edifying possibilities 
that illness presents (Carel 2011, 2016; Kidd 2012).
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